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Abstract
This note applies insights from a famous problem in price theory, "Shipping the Good Apples
Out," to expand the comparative static predictions of the model of monetary donations and
volunteering developed by Andreoni, Gale and Scotz (1996). we show that the Hicksian
supply of volunteering may be an increasing function of the wage, if volunteering is strongly
complementary to either donations or consumption. It is also possible for government charity
to crowd−in private contributions.
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People make charitable contributions of both time and money. Most empirical
studies of charitable giving have focused on either donations of money or donations of
time, but not both.
1  Over the last decade, as data on volunteer labor supply have become
more accessible, several empirical papers have estimated donations and volunteering
simultaneously [Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Brown and Lankford (1992), Callen
(1994)].  However, only recently have theoretical models of giving and volunteering been
developed.  Duncan (1999) provides a public goods model where the presence of labor
supply allows imperfect crowding-out of donations.  Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1996,
henceforth AGS) develop and estimate what we take to be the canonical model of warm-
glow contributions of time and money.
2
This note extends and elaborates upon the comparative statics of the AGS model.
AGS consider a consumer who derives utility from an aggregate consumption good,
donations, volunteering, and leisure.  However, they assume in their theoretical model
that the cross-partials of the utility function are all zero (AGS footnote 6, p. 6).
3
Although this allows sharp predictions, it obscures some interesting possibilities.  When
there are more than two goods in the utility function, the demand for one good will be
affected not only by its degree of substitutability or complementarity with each of the
other goods, but also by the degree of substitutability or complementarity of the other
goods with each other.  A full accounting of the comparative statics of the model must
capture the “indirect,” as well as the “direct,” interactions across goods.  This is not to
say, “anything can happen” without further restrictions on preferences.  “Indirect” feed-
back between goods lies at the heart of a famous problem in price theory, first posed by
Alchian and Allen (1969), “Shipping the Good Apples Out.”  We exploit an unexpected
isomorphism between the mathematics of this problem [Gould and Seagall (1969),
Borcherding and Silberberg (1978)] and the AGS model.  The model yields sufficient
conditions to sign comparative static derivatives that may suggest cross-equation
restrictions that may be of use in simultaneous estimation of donations and volunteering.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section I lays out the model.  In order to
abstract from income effects, Section II characterizes the Hicksian supplies of donations
and volunteering and donations. In Section II.A we establish a surprising proposition: an
increase in the wage may actually increase the Hicksian supply of volunteering, provided
that volunteering is sufficiently complementary with either donations or the consumption
good.  In Section II.B we also show that government provision of charity need not crowd
out private volunteering or donations.  It is possible for an increase in government charity
to increase the Hicksian supply of donations.  Section IV offers some concluding
thoughts.
                                                          
1 Empirical studies of monetary contributions include Reece (1979), Reece and Zieschang (1985),
Feenberg (1987), Kingma (1989), Randolph (1995). Empirical studies of volunteer labor supply include
Dye (1980), Segal (1992), Segal, Mauser, and Weisbrod (1992), Menchik and Weisbrod (1987).
2 There is now a large literature on warm-glow giving.  See Cornes and Sandler (1984,1986), Schiff
(1985), Posnett and Sandler (1986), Sandler and Posnett (1991), Andreoni (1989,1990), Menchik and
Weisbrod (1987), Kingma (1989), Lucas and Stark (1985), Steinberg (1986,1987) and Harbaugh (1998).
3 In their empirical model, AGS assume that preferences are quadratic.1
2 The Model
Imagine a person with the utility function
() UU x m hg = ,,, ; . l (1)
x is a consumption good, a composite commodity of goods and services purchased on
the market. mis the quantity of charitable goods financed by the consumer’s donations.
h is the number of hours she spends in volunteering activities. l is the number of hours
she spends in household activities, which we will call  “home leisure.” g denotes
government provision of charity.  The consumer derives a “warm-glow” from giving both
money mand time h. For the moment, we merely assume that  () U • is twice-differentiable
in all of its arguments, and increasing and quasi-concave in xmh ,,, and l. We will need to
make more restrictive assumptions later, in order to arrive at specific comparative static
results.  Our focus in this paper is solely on the choice problem of an individual
consumer, so we abstract from strategic interactions.
4
Suppose that the price of the aggregate consumption good is  px,the price of
donations is pm(equal to 1 minus the marginal tax rate on charitable deductions), andwis
the wage (all measured in dollars).  Non-wage income is y. If the consumer has a total
of H available hours, her budget constraint is
5
() wH y p x p m w h xm += + + + l (2)
Notice that volunteering hand home leisurelhave the same nominal opportunity cost, w.
In other words, when the consumer chooses not to work an additional hour, she sacrifices
the same amount regardless of whether she volunteers or enjoys home leisure.  This has
the important implication that the sum of volunteering and home leisure can be thought
of as a composite commodity. We will call this composite commodity “total leisure” (in
the sense that it is the total time spent on non-market activities), Lh =+ l. This fact will
prove useful in developing the predictions of the model mathematically, since a change
inwchanges two nominal prices.
                                                          
4 Our formulation of preferences differs from that of AGS in two respects.  First, they assume that utility
depends upon the value of volunteering to the charity, rather than the number of hours volunteered.
Second, they do not incorporate government charity into their model.  Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) wrote
down a version of this model.  However, they only derived the first-order conditions, and did not develop
the comparative statics of the model.  Schiff (1990) discusses donations and volunteering as different
aspects of charitable behavior, but develops a formal model only of donations (Chapter 2).
5 Given the monotonicity of the utility function, the budget constraint will be binding at the optimum, so
we write it as an equality.2
3 Hicksian Demand and Supply Functions
Since the burden of our argument will rest upon substitution between
volunteering, donations, and consumption, it will be useful to abstract from income
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g h m x U U t s y wH h w m p x p m x = − − + + +
(3)
If  () ep p w xm ,,is the expenditure function associated with this problem, then Shephard’s
Lemma leads to the Hicksian demand for consumption and the Hicksian supplies for
donations and labor
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Notice that Shephard’s Lemma allows us to recover the Hicksian demand for total
leisure () Lp p w xm ,,, but not its constituent parts, volunteering  () hp p w xm ,,and home
leisure () l ppw xm ,, .
3.a Donations, Volunteering, and Their Prices
Ignoring the components of the composite commodity, our model is identical to
the standard textbook model of consumer behavior.   This means that the expenditure
function has all of the usual properties [see Varian (1995, p. 72-73), for example].  In
particular, it is strictly concave in px, pm,andw, so we may invoke the standard result:























AGS [Equation (3), p. 6] derive the Marshallian version of (6), showing that the
uncompensated supply of donations is decreasing in its price.  Notice, that (7) does not
imply that either the Hicksian supply of volunteering  () hp p w xm ,,or the Hicksian demand
for home leisure () l ppw xm ,,will not increase when the wage increases; it only asserts that
the sum of these non-market activities cannot increase.  We will have to resort to other
arguments to uncover the effects of a change in the wage on volunteering and home
leisure.3
How does an increase in the wage affect the Hicksian supply of volunteering?
Let us answer this question by posing another, seemingly unrelated question: Suppose
that two types of apples are produced in one locality and exported to another locality.
They differ in quality, so that the better apples fetch a higher price to the producer.  There
is a common, constant cost of transporting both types of apples to the market.  Question:
if transportation costs increase, what happens to the relative demands for the two types of
apples at the market?  Is it possible for the relative demand for the good apples to
increase, so that more of the good apples get exported from the producing locality (to the
chagrin of apple lovers in the producing locale).  This is a classic problem in price theory
- “Shipping the Good Apples Out” - variants of which have appeared in textbooks for
decades [Alchian and Allen (1969), Stigler (1966), Hirshleifer (1976), Silberberg
(1990)].
The textbook answer, offered by Alchian and Allen (1969), is that the demand for
good apples must increase, since their price (including transportation costs) relative to the
bad apples has decreased.  We will call this the “direct” substitution effect.
Gould and Seagall (1969) challenged this argument by introducing a third,
composite commodity in the budget set.  In this case, an increase in transportation costs
changes the relative prices of both types of apples with the third good. Demand for the
good apples might increase or decrease, depending upon the extent to which consumers
regard good apples as substitutes or complements for the third good.
6  We call this the
“indirect” substitution effect.
The problem of “shipping the good apples out” is isomorphic to our problem,
except that the two “apples” (volunteering and home leisure) have the same dollar price
(the wage), and that there are two other goods (consumption and donations).   The rise in
the wage has the same effect as an increase in transportation costs.   Since the prices of
the “apples” are the same, there is no “direct” substitution effect at all, but only an
“indirect” substitution effect.  The effects of the change in transportation costs (wages)
thus depend upon the whether consumers view the two types of apples as substitutes or
complements for the other goods in the budget set.  Our problem might be described as
“shipping the good times out:” Is it possible that an increase in the wage will induce
people to spend less time at home, and more time volunteering? 
Adapting the proof in Gould and Seagall (1969), we prove the following
proposition in the Appendix:
Proposition 2.  The Hicksian supply of volunteering may actually be an increasing
function of the wage, provided that volunteering is a sufficiently strong Hicksian
complement to either consumption or donations.
7
To provide some insight into when this paradoxical outcome is likely to occur, we
adapt an argument employed by Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) and Silberberg
                                                          
6 Borcherding and Silberberg (1978) defended the empirical relevance of the “Alchian and Allen Theorem”
against the theoretical argument of Gould and Seagall (1969).  Umbeck (1980) later criticized Borcherding
and Silberberg (1978).
7 AGS (p. 6) note that the sign of the comparative static effect of the wage on the Marshallian supply of
volunteering is ambiguous.  They attribute this ambiguity to the usual offsetting income and substitution
effects.  In fact, even the slope of the Hicksian supply of volunteering is of ambiguous sign.4
(1990, pp. 388).  Since the Hicksian supply of volunteering is homogeneous of degree
zero with respect to price of donations and the wage, Euler’s theorem leads to the
familiar elasticity restriction:
εε ε hw hp hp mx ++= 0, (8)
whereεε hw hpm , , andεhp xare the elasticities of () w p p h m x , ,  with respect towp m , and px,
respectively. This means that if both consumption and donations are Hicksian substitutes
for volunteering (εε hp hp xm >> 00 , ) then the Hicksian supply of volunteering will
unambiguously decrease when the wage increases (εhw < 0). However if either
consumption or donations is a Hicksian complement to volunteering (εhpx < 0or εhpm < 0),
then the Hicksian supply of volunteering will increase when the wage increases (εhw > 0).
Using the same kind of reasoning, it is easy to establish that an analogous result
holds for home leisure: if either consumption or donations is a Hicksian complement to
home leisure, then the Hicksian demand for home leisure will increase when the wage
increases.
  Notice that these paradoxical possibilities -- that volunteering and home leisure
may actually increase with the wage -- rest upon strong complementarities between
volunteering and home leisure, on the one hand, and donations, on the other.  These
complementarities cannot be “too” strong, however, since – according to Proposition 1 –
the Hicksian demand for total leisure (volunteering plus home leisure) must be a non-
increasing function of the wage.  In other words, either volunteering or home leisure may
be an increasing function of the wage, but not both.
What are we to make of the counter-intuitive prediction that volunteering may be
an increasing function of the wage?  To develop some intuition for this result, consider a
simpler model where there is no consumption, only donations, volunteering, and leisure.
We have seen that if the wage increases, then total leisure () w p p L m x , , will decrease as the
consumer substitutes toward donations.  This is where the analysis would stop in the
standard model of leisure-consumption choice.  Here, however, the increased donations
may feedback to alter the marginal utilities of volunteering and home leisure in different
ways.  Suppose, on the one hand, that the increase in donations were to decrease the
marginal utility of both volunteering and home leisure.  In this case, the demand for both
volunteering and home leisure would unambiguously decrease.   Now suppose, on the
other hand, that the increase in donations were to raise the marginal utility of
volunteering, but lower the marginal utility of home leisure.  Given the complementarity
between volunteering and donations, the supply of volunteering actually increases.  The
same kind of intuition applies in our more complicated setting, except that the response
of volunteering to the increase in wage depends upon the interaction of volunteering and
home leisure with consumption, as well as donations.
3.b Private Philanthropy and Public Giving
We now analyze the impact of changes in public giving() g on the Hicksian
provision of private philanthropy  () w p p h m x , ,  and  () . , , w p p m m x  In general, it is hard to say
much about the comparative static effects of changes in  g , since, in principle, a change5
in  g  may alter the marginal utilities of all four of the goods, as well as confer utility
itself.  We impose the plausible simplifying assumption that changes in  g do not affect
the marginal utilities of consumption or home leisure ( 0 = = g xg U U l ). However, we will
allow g  to affect the marginal utilities of the two philanthropic activities available to the
consumer, donations and volunteering.  Finally, we assume that the direct effect of g on
utility ( g U ) is fairly small.  In keeping with the partial-equilibrium flavor of the model,
we ignore the question of how the government finances these expenditures.  In particular,
we assume that government expenditures are not funded by taxes on the consumer.
Consider two cases.  First, imagine that an increase in  g decreases the marginal
utility of donations, but has no impact on the marginal utility of volunteering.  In the
Appendix we prove 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that U g > 0is small, that UUU xg hg g === l 0but that Umg < 0.An
increase in government charity will unambiguously decrease the Hicksian supply of
private donations,∂∂ mg /. < 0 It will increase the supply of volunteering,∂∂ hg /. > 0
The intuition for this result is straightforward.  An increase in public giving
reduces the marginal rate of substitution of giving money relative to volunteering,
causing the consumer to substitute away from donations toward volunteering as an outlet
for her philanthropic tastes.
8
A more complicated example allows the marginal utilities of both donations and
volunteering to be affected by the change in  g.In the Appendix we prove
Proposition 4.  Suppose that volunteering and donations are Hicksian substitutes, that
U g > 0is small, thatUU xg g == l 0, but thatUmg < 0and 0 < hg U .  It is possible for an
increase in government charity to increase the Hicksian supply of private donations,
so∂∂ mg /. > 0 It may increase or decrease the supply of volunteering ∂∂ hg /? . 0
5  Conclusion and Discussion
This note fleshes out the comparative statics of the AGS model by applying
insights from a classic problem in price theory, “Shipping the Good Apples Out.”  We
establish two paradoxical theoretical possibilities.
First, the Hicksian supply of volunteering may theoretically be positively sloped.
It is of course possible for the Marshallian supply of volunteering to increase with the
wage if volunteering is a normal good. Our argument is that complementarity between
volunteering and consumption may make the Marshallian supply of volunteering become
positively sloped, even if volunteering is an inferior good.  At first glance, this may seem
                                                          
8 Actually, there is a bit more to the story.  An increase in g causes a direct increase in utility (U g > 0).
This amounts to an “in-kind” transfer of utility that shifts the consumer to a higher indifference contour
(analogous to an increase in output in a cost minimization problem).  This generally tends to increase the
demand for all goods, even if the marginal rates of substitution between them do not change (assuming this
is true is analogous to assuming that factors of production in a cost minimization problem are not inferior).6
to be more than a theoretical curiosity, since Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Callen
(1994), and Brown and Lankford (1992) find giving and volunteering to be Marshallian
complements. AGS also find contributions of time and money to be Marshallian
complements.  However, their estimates also suggest that (1) giving and volunteering are
(weak) Hicksian substitutes, and (2) volunteer labor supply is in fact a decreasing
function of the wage.  
Second, it is also possible for government provision of charity to cause private
donations to increase.  That is, there may actually be crowding-in.  There has been ample
evidence of partial crowing-out in monetary donations [Abrams and Schitz (1978),
Roberts (1984), Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995), Kingma (1989), Steinberg (1985),
Reece (1979), and Schiff (1985)].  However, Khanna and Sandler (2000) have recently
demonstrated evidence of crowding-in of government grants in the UK.
While neither of these paradoxical outcomes has much empirical support, they
highlight the complex web of interactions that is hidden beneath the surface of such a
simple model.  Our theoretical results may suggest cross-equation restrictions -- such as
the elasticity condition in equation (8) -- in empirical estimation of contributions of time
and money.7
Appendix
Derivation of Propositions 1, 2, and 3
Our derivation follows that of Gould and Seagall (1969) closely.
In order to highlight the “direct” and “indirect” effects of a change in the wage,
suppose initially that the opportunity costs of volunteering and home leisure are not
equal.   For example, volunteering may offer some small compensation (s) per hour to
cover transportation costs, so that if the market wage is w, thenww = l and ww s h =− l . It
will also save space to definewp ll = and wp hh = .The budget constraint then becomes
pH y px pm ph p xmh ll l += + + + . (A.1)
  The Lagrangian for the minimization problem in Equation (6) of the text
becomes
() [] Lp xp mp hp p Hy UU x m hg xmh =+++ −− +− ll ll λ ,,, ; . (A.2)
The first-order conditions are
PU i x m h ii == λ ,, , , l (A.3)
() UU x m hg = ,,, ; . . l (A.4)
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where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier.  The sufficient second-order conditions are that
the naturally ordered principal minors of this matrix be negative [Varian (1995, pp. 499-
500)].
Let M < 0 be the determinant of the bordered Hessian, and let  Mij be the cofactor
for the element in the ith row and jth column in the bordered Hessian,ij xm h ,, , , , . = l λ  It
will also save space to write the vector of endogenous variables
as[] [] xmh X X X X xmh ,,, , , , . l l =  Using the notation of Gould and Seagall (1969), the
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Now suppose that the prices of both volunteering and home leisure increase by
the same amount dp dp dw h == > l 0 (the market wage increases).  The resulting change in
the Hicksian supply of volunteering is8
() dX K K dw hh h h =+ l . (A.7)
M < 0 by the second-order conditions, and Mhh < 0since it is a border-preserving principle
minor.  Therefore  KM M hh hh =− < /. 0 However, Khlcannot be signed.
Intuitively, Khh captures the standard “own-price” substitution effect of a wage increase
on volunteering: it is unambiguously negative.  Unlike the standard, two-good model,
however, an increase in the wage increases raises the prices of two goods, volunteering
and home leisure.  Khlcaptures the complex interactions between volunteering, home
leisure, donations, and consumption caused by this second price change; it need not be
negative. 
To see when dX hmay be positive, we follow Gould and Seagall (1969) in
invoking Hicks’ third law [Silberberg (1990, pp. 342-343)]: 
pK pK pK pK xx h mm h hh h h + ++= ll 0. (A.8)































This corresponds to Equation (7a) in Gould and Seagall (1969, p. 134), except that they
consider the case of only three goods.  
In our model, the opportunity costs of volunteering and donations are the same, so
that  ppw h == l ..  This causes the first term in (A.9) – the “direct” substitution effect – to




















If both consumption and donations are substitutes for volunteering ( Kxh > 0and  Kmh > 0),
then volunteering must decrease with the wage.  However, if either consumption or
donations is a sufficiently strong complement with volunteering ( Kxh << 0or  Kmv << 0),
then it is possible for an increase in the wage to increase volunteering.  This proves
Proposition 1.
Now consider the effects of an increase in public charity, g . Suppose that this
decreases the marginal utilities of donations and volunteering (UU mg hg << 00 , ) but has no
impact on the marginal utilities of consumption or home leisure (UU xg g == l 0). An
increase in g does confer utility itself (U g > 0). The comparative static effects of the
change in  g on the Hicksian supplies of donations and volunteering are then:9
[] {} dX U K U K U K dg m m gm m h gm h g m =− + + λ λ , (A.11)
[] {} dX U K U K U K dg hm g h m h g h h g h =− + + λ λ . (A.12)
The own-price substitution effects are negative ( KK mm hh << 00 , ). We will assume
that volunteering and donations are substitutes, so that the cross-price substitution effects
are positive ( KK hm mh => 0).  We also assume that  K m λ < 0and
K h λ < 0(Since KM M ii λλ =− /, this requires  Miλ > 0,which is analogous to assuming that
the factors of production in a cost minimization problem are not inferior,).
Consider the two cases discussed in the text.  First, suppose that an increase
in g increases the marginal utility of donations, but has no effect on the marginal utility of
volunteering (UU mg hg <= 00 , ). In this case
[] dX U K U K mx g m m g m =− + λ λ , (A.13)
[] dX U K U K hx g h m g h =− + λ λ . (A.14)
Assuming that the direct effect of G on utility (U g ) is small, public charity crowds-out
private donations, but stimulates volunteering (Proposition 3).
Second, consider the more complicated case where an increase in g decreases the
marginal utilities of both donations and volunteering (UU xg hg << 00 , ).  From (A.11) and
(A.12), it is clear that ifUhg is large enough in absolute value, it is possible that
dX m > 0and dX h < 0(Proposition 4).10
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